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Abstract
In game theory, there is a basic methodological dichotomy between Harsanyis
"game-theoretic" view and Aumanns "Bayesian decision-theoretic" view of the world.
We follow the game-theoretic view, propose and study interim partially correlated ra-
tionalizability for games with incomplete information. We argue that the distinction
between this solution concept and the interim correlated rationalizability studied by
Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) is fundamental, in that the latter implicitly follows
Aumanns Bayesian view.
Our main result shows that two types provide the same prediction in interim par-
tially correlated rationalizability if and only if they have the same innite hierarchy of
beliefs over conditional beliefs. We also establish an equivalence result between this
solution concept and the Bayesian solutiona notion of correlated equilibrium proposed
by Forges (1993).
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1 Introduction
In complete information games, rationalizability is an important solution concept. It was rst
introduced independently by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Intuitively, a rationalizable
action is one that a player may play given the minimal assumption of common knowledge
of rationality among players. We join the e¤ort in extending rationalizability to games with
incomplete information. In particular, we study interim rationalizable actions: actions that
are rationalizable to a player after she receives her private information. Harsanyi type spaces
(Harsanyi, 1967-1968), which model playersprivate information as their (private) types and
parameters of payo¤ functions as states of nature, are the basic tool for studying games with
incomplete information. With this tool, the problem transforms into studying rationalizable
actions for any given type of a player.
Similar to rationalizable actions in complete information games, interim rationalizable
actions can also be dened using the procedure of iterative elimination of never best response
actions. In this procedure, actions that are not a best response to any conjectures are
eliminated step by step, and the actions that survive to the end are called rationalizable. In
games with incomplete information, players need to conjecture on both the othersactions
and states of nature. If we x a type space, how should we dene a players belief over both
the othersactions and states of nature?
There are generally two approaches to model such beliefs: Harsanyis game-theoretic view
(Harsanyi, 1967-1968), or principle, and Aumanns Bayesian (decision-theoretic) view (Au-
mann, 1987)1. Harsanyis principle distinguishes states of nature as independent variables
and actions as type-contingent variables, and insists that subjective probabilities should
be assigned only to independent variables. Instead, Aumanns Bayesian view holds that
1This distinction between Aumanns Bayesian view and Harsanyis principle is also adopted by Forges
(1993) in dening correlated equilibria for games with incomplete information. In her terminologies, the two
viewpoints are named the universal Bayesian approach and the partial Bayesian approach, respectively.
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subjective probabilities are assignable to anything unknown, including the othersactions.
We use an example taken from Ely and P¾eski (2006) to illustrate the e¤ects of these
di¤erent approaches.
Example 1. This is a two-player game with incomplete information, with states of nature
parameterized by  = f1; 2g: Each player has three actions, Ai = fai; bi; cig; i = 1; 2; and
playerspayo¤s are given by
a2 b2 c2
a1 1; 1  10; 10  10; 0
b1  10; 10 1; 1  10; 0
c1 0; 10 0; 10 0; 0
1
a2 b2 c2
a1  10; 10 1; 1  10; 0
b1 1; 1  10; 10  10; 0
c1 0; 10 0; 10 0; 0
2
Figure 1.
Given the payo¤s, players would like to match, on a or b, in state 1 and mismatch in
state 2. Players can also play action c, which is a safe action and always pays 0.
Consider rst a trivial type space T in which each player has just one type: T1 = T2 = fg:
Assume it is common knowledge between players that 1 and 2 happen with equal probability.
Since players are symmetric, we concentrate on player 1.
With Harsanyis principle, playersactions must be type contingent. Since player 2 has
only one type, player 1 expect player 2 to play the same strategies (pure or mixed) in states
1 and 2. Given any strategy of player 2, actions a1 and b1 give player 1 strictly negative
expected payo¤s and thus are strictly dominated by c1. As a result, c1 is the only rationalizable
action for player 1.
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If instead we follow Aumanns Bayesian view, player 1 could legitimately conjecture that
player 2 plays a2 at state 1 and b2 at state 2: Given this conjecture, it is a unique best
response for player 1 to play a1. We can similarly check that the product set fa1; b1gfa2; b2g
is a best reply set, and thus a subset of rationalizable action proles.
Previously, Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007) proposed a notion of interim correlated
rationalizability. Their approach implicitly ts with Aumanns Bayesian view; they assume
that a players conjecture over the otherstypes, states of nature and the othersactions could
be an arbitrary probability measure over the product space, as long as it is consistent with
her belief in the type space. The type space that models incomplete information about states
of nature, in their view, is the marginal of an epistemic type space that models incomplete
information about both states of nature and the othersactions.
We, instead, adopt Harsanyis principle and dene interim partially correlated rationaliz-
ability. We assume that actions are type-contingent variables, and that a players conjecture
over the others actions and states of nature are induced by her belief in the type space
together with a type-correlated strategy of the others. A type-correlated strategy of the
othersmaps each prole of their types to a probability measure on their action proles. If
we take the agent-normal-form view of a type space, i.e., if we view each type as an agent, the
correlation is exactly the same as that in correlated rationalizability in complete information
games. In other words, the correlation we permit can be viewed as interim correlation, while
that permitted by Dekel et al. can be viewed as ex post correlation.
Although interim partially correlated rationalizability may seem to be a renement of
interim correlated rationalizability at the rst sight, the distinction between them is purely
methodological and therefore more fundamental. A type space is an articially constructed
object used to model incomplete information. In order to dene the "right" solution concept
on it, we need to know beforehand what information is incorporated into the types; more
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precisely, we need to know whether types contain enough information to tell if the others
actions are type-contingent or not. Conventional construction of types (Mertens and Za-
mir, 1986) relies on eliciting playersbeliefs and higher-order beliefs about states of nature.
These type spaces, although su¢ cient for Aumanns Bayesian view of modeling games, are
insu¢ cient for Harsanyis principle. Indeed, a players hierarchy of beliefs about states of
nature does not contain any information about whether there is direct correlation between
the othersactions and states of nature. This can be illustrated with a simple type space
presented in Ely and P¾eski (2006).
Example 2. Fix the type space T in Example 1; we describe a type space T^ that has the
same set of hierarchies of beliefs about states of nature. Let T^1 = T^2 = f+1; 1g; and assume
there is a common prior on T^1  T^2 :
1 :
t1nt2 +1  1
+1 1
4
0
 1 0 1
4
2 :
t1nt2 +1  1
+1 0 1
4
 1 1
4
0
Figure 2.
Given the prior, two players have the same type if and only if the state is 1 and two
players have di¤erent types if and only if the state is 2. At both +1 and  1 in T^ , each player
has the same hierarchy of beliefs about states of nature, i.e., common knowledge that 1 and 2
happen with equal probability, which is the same as that at type  in T . Thus T^ is redundant
with respect to conventional hierarchies of beliefs2. The information we elicited from players
is insu¢ cient for us to tell which of T and T^ models the actual game environment.
We return to the game in Example 1. If player 1 believes that the distribution on A2
2See Liu (2005) for a general study on the redundancy of hierarchies of beliefs in type spaces and the
state-dependent correlating mechanism that characterizes it.
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is 1
2
(1; a2) and 12(2; b2); in T she must conjecture that player 2s action directly depends on
states of nature; however, in T^ , at her type +1 for example, the belief can be justied by the
conjecture that player 2 plays a type-contingent strategy: a2 at +1 and b2 at  1. Because
from a players conventional hierarchy of beliefs we cannot tell apart T and T^ , we cannot
tell from it whether the othersactions are type-contingent or not.
Since Harsanyis principle is almost always implicitly assumed in applications, it is im-
portant to know that in order for a type space to satisfy the principle, what additional
information needs to be gathered to incorporate into it? The other side of the same ques-
tion, which is more straightforward, is to study how we represent such information, in some
form of hierarchies of beliefs, after the construction of the type space. Example 2 suggests
that the representation must be sensitive to correlated signals that directly depend on states
of nature. The hierarchy of beliefs constructed in following way is called -hierarchy of
beliefs, and was rst introduced by Ely and P¾eski (2006): if we x a type of a player, then,
conditional on each prole of types of the others, the player will have a conditional belief
about states of nature, and her belief about the otherstypes induces sequentially her belief
and higher-order beliefs on the set of conditional beliefs.
Our main result shows that two types have the same interim partially correlated ratio-
nalizable behavior if and only if they have the same -hierarchy of beliefs. Not only does
this result identify the information that characterizes rationalizable behavior, but also, it
provides us with the representation of information necessary for Harsanyis principle. The
su¢ ciency part of this result can be contrasted with Proposition 1 in Dekel et al. (2007).
They show that the identication of interim correlated rationalizability requires only innite
hierarchies of beliefs over states of nature. The distinction between the two identications
explicitly describes the distinction between the methodological viewpoints behind the two
solution concepts.
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This paper directly extends Ely and P¾eski (2006). Ely and P¾eski study interim inde-
pendent rationalizability in two-player games, and introduce -hierarchies of beliefs for its
identication. There are multiple extensions of their denition to games with more than
two players, due to the existence of multiple ways to formulate correlations; our denition is
exactly the one that retains the full implication of -hierarchies of beliefs. The key di¤er-
ence is that we study interim "correlated" rationalizability, instead of interim independent
rationalizablity. Naturally, the proof to our main result can be readily extended from Ely
and P¾eskis work. Nevertheless, we adopt approaches from theirs and make our proofs to
both the necessity part and su¢ ciency part of the main result more direct and accessible.
To justify interim partially correlated rationalizability, we also establish an equivalence
result between it and the Bayesian solutiona notion of correlated equilibrium proposed by
Forges (1993). The Bayesian solution is dened obeying the partial Bayesian approach,
which is equivalent to Harsanyis principle. We show that type-correlated strategies of the
otherscan be justied by the Bayesian solution; this result describes explicitly how corre-
lations in the othersactions can be achieved. Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) show, for
complete information games, the payo¤ equivalence between correlated rationalizability and
a posteriori equilibrium. As an analogue of their result, we show the payo¤ equivalence
between interim partially correlated rationalizability and the Bayesian solution.
Some other research are also related to this paper. Liu (2005) and Liu (2009) study
type spaces with the same set of conventional hierarchies of beliefs and Liu (2005) char-
acterize the redundancy with state-dependent correlating mechanisms. The type space T^
in Example 2 can be explained as one such mechanism. Tang (2010) further characterizes
the correlation embedded in type spaces with the same set of -hierarchies of beliefs, and
studies its implication for the Bayesian solution. These characterizations make more explicit
the connections between interim correlated rationalizability and interim partially correlated
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rationalizability3. Using garblings instead of correlating devices, Lehrer, Rosenberg and
Shmaya (2006) examine the connections between type spaces that are payo¤ equivalent in
all Bayesian games, for various notions of correlated equilibrium, including the Bayesian so-
lution. The non-communicating garblings they use are inherently equivalent to information
mappings that preserve conditional beliefs.
We organize the paper as follows. We introduce notations and models and dene solution
concepts in Section 2. Examples are also given to distinguish di¤erent solutions. We describe
the constructions of hierarchies of beliefs in Section 3, and present our main results and results
on the connections between solution concepts in Section 4. Section 5 studies the equivalence
between the Bayesian solution and our solution. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Set up
We begin with some notations. For any metric space X; let X denote the space of prob-
ability measures on the Borel -algebra of X endowed with the weak-topology. Let the
product of two metric spaces be endowed with the product Borel -algebra. Let supp be
the support of a probability measure ; i.e., the smallest closed set with probability 1 under
. For any measure  2 (X  Y ); denote margX  the marginal distribution of  on X.
For any measure  2 X and integrable function f : X ! R, denote [f ] the expectation
of f under .
We study games with incomplete information with n players. The set of players is
N = f1; 2; :::; ng: For each i 2 N; let  i denote the set of is opponents. Players play a game
in which the payo¤s are uncertain and parameterized by a nite set : Each element  2 
3And also the connections between the universal Bayesian solution (Forges, 1993) and the Bayesian
solution.
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is called a state of nature. For each i 2 N; denote Ai the set of actions for player i, and
A  i2NAi the set of action proles: A (strategic form) game is a prole G = (gi; Ai)i2N .
For each i 2 N; we assume the payo¤ function is bounded: gi : A! [ M;M ]; for some
positive real number M . The set of nite bounded games is denoted by G.
A type space over  is dened as T = (Ti; i)i2N ; where for each i; Ti is a compact
metric space of types for player i and i : Ti ! (T i  ) is a measurable mapping that
describes player is belief over the otherstypes and states of nature for any type of player
i. A strategy of player i is a mapping i : Ti ! Ai: Let  = (i)i2N be a strategy prole,
and with a little abuse of notation, let  i : T i ! A i be a type-correlated strategy of
the others. The intuition behind type-correlated strategies is provided in the next section.
Throughout, given arbitrary x 2 X and y 2 Y; we use the notation i(x)[y] to denote
player is belief about y conditional on x. More precisely, the object in the round bracket
always denotes the object that player i conditions on, and the object in the square bracket
always denotes the object that player i assigns probability to.
2.2 Solution concepts
We propose and study interim partially correlated rationalizability, or IPCR, for games with
incomplete information. Previously, Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris (2007, DFM, hereafter)
propose both interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) and interim independent rationaliz-
ability (IIR); and for two-player games, Ely and P¾eski (2006) independently dene IIR in a
formulation equivalent to DFMs. In this section, we rst dene our new solution concept
and then compare it with the other two. Examples are given at the end of the section.
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2.2.1 Interim partially correlated rationalizability
Rationalizability can be dened in many equivalent approaches; we start with the iterative
elimination of never best response actions procedure. Player is (joint) conjecture on the
otherstypes, states of nature and the othersactions is a joint distribution v 2 (T i
A i). Let mv[(; a i)] 
R
T i
v[(dt i; ; a i)] denote the marginal probability of v at (; a i),
i.e., mv = margA i v. An action ai 2 Ai is a best response to a conjecture v if
ai 2 arg max
a0i2Ai
X
;a i
gi((a
0
i; a i); )m
v(; a i):
Without referring to specic constraints on conjectures, interim rationalizability can in gen-
eral be dened as follows: for each player i 2 N; the rst round of elimination eliminates
actions in Ai that are not a best response to any conjectures about the othersplay. In
the k + 1-th round, a level-k conjecture assigns positive probability only to actions of the
othersthat are level-(k   1) rationalizable, and actions that are not a best response to any
level-k conjectures are eliminated. The elimination procedure stops in nite rounds. Actions
that survive k rounds of elimination are called level-k rationalzable actions and actions that
survive to the end are called rationalizable actions. Di¤erent notions of interim rationaliz-
ability may be dened using the same procedure. We rst dene interim partially correlated
rationalizability.
Denition 1. Fix a game G and a type space T . For all ti 2 Ti; RTi;0(tijG)  Ai: An action
is level-k rationalizable at ti, i.e., ai 2 RTi;k(tijG); if there exists v 2 (T i  A i) such
that
1. (t i; ; a i) 2 supp v ) a i 2 RT i;(k 1)(t i); where RT i;(k 1)(t i)  (RTj;(k 1)(tj)jG)j 6=i;
2. ai 2 argmaxa0i2Ai
P
;a i gi((a
0
i; a i); )m
v[(; a i)];
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3. (constraint on conjectures) There exists a type-correlated strategy  i : T i ! A i
such that
mv[(; a i)] =
Z
T i
 i(t i)[a i]  i(ti)[(dt i; )]: (2.1)
Let RTi (tijG) =
1T
k=1
RTi;k(tijG): Actions in RTi (tijG) are said to be interim partially corre-
lated rationalizable at type ti:
By denition, RTi (tijG) is always non-empty. Hereafter, we suppress the notation G in
RTi (tijG) unless it is necessary for clarity.
In the denition of IPCR, each joint conjecture v 2 (T iA i) is induced by player
is belief i(ti) 2 (T i) in the type space and a type-correlated strategy  i(t i) 2 A i
of the others. When type spaces are nite, item 2.1 can be simplied as
v[(t i; ; a i)] = i(ti)[(t i; )]   i(t i)[a i]:
By adopting this constraint on conjectures, we are following Harsanyis principle on mod-
eling games with incomplete information. Harsanyi models actions as variables dependent
on types. This expression also connects interim partially correlated rationalizability with
Forgess partial Bayesian approach (Forges, 1993): players form subjective beliefs about the
otherstypes and states of nature, but their beliefs over the othersactions are not subjec-
tively formed. See subsubsection 4.2.1 for more discussions.
The type-correlated strategy  i : T i ! A i also deserves some clarication. We
are not assuming that the others are sharing information with each other and playing in a
coordinated fashion; instead, we take the view that the correlation may come from possibly
correlated type-contingent extraneous signals that other players receive (see Section 5), or
from player is ignorance over the othersbeliefs about each others action (Aumann, 1987,
section 6).
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2.2.2 Interim correlated rationalizability and interim independent rationaliz-
ability
To promote understanding, we present the denitions of ICR and IIR proposed by DFM.
Since the denitions di¤er only in constraint on conjectures (item 3 in Denition 1), it su¢ ces
for us to present the respective variations of item 3.
Denition 2. Fix a game G and a type space T . We can dene the set of interim correlated
rationalizability actions at ti, denoted as ICRTi (tijG), and the set of interim independent
rationalizability at ti, denoted as IIRTi (tijG), by replacing item 3 in Denition 1, respectively,
1. ICR (constraint on conjectures) margT i v = i(ti):
2. IIR (constraint on conjectures) There exist independent strategies j : Tj ! Aj; j 6=
i; such that
mv =
Z
T i
Y
j 6=i
j(tj)[aj]  i(ti)[dt i; ]: (2.2)
In the denition of ICR, the constraint requires only that the conjecture v 2 (T i 
  A i) be consistent with player is belief i(ti) over T i   in the type space. DFM
follow Aumanns Bayesian view and treat every player as a Bayesian decision maker who
faces three uncertainties: states of nature, the otherstypes and their actions. Conjectures
are explained as playerssubjective beliefs over these uncertainties; actions are not treated
as type-contingent variables anymore. In Forgess terminology, this approach is called the
universal Bayesian approach, as in contrast with the partial Bayesian approach.
In the denition of IIR, the constraint is that player i believes that the others are playing
independently. Correlations among the othersactions, if there is any, are characterized by
the correlations among the types of the others, which have already been incorporated in
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i(ti). When type spaces are nite, item 2.2 can be simplied as
v[(t i; ; a i)] = i(ti)[(t i; )] 
Y
j 6=i
j(tj)[aj]:
By denition, IIR and IPCR coincide in two-player games.
2.3 Examples
We now show in examples how distinct notions of rationalizability di¤er in predictions. The
distinction between IPCR and ICR has been illustrated in Example 1 in the introduction.
For player 1, the set of interim partially correlated rationalizable actions at the type t1 = 
is fc1g, while the set of interim correlated rationalizable actions at that type is fa1; b1; c1g.
Now we illustrate with an example the distinction between IPCR and IIR. To do that, we
need a game with at least three players
Example 3. Consider a three-player game with no payo¤ uncertainty,  = fg: The action
sets are A1 = fa1; b1g; A2 = fa2; b2g; A3 = fa3; b3; c3g; and the payo¤s are given by
a2 b2
a1 1; 1; 2 0; 0; 2
b1 0; 0; 2 0; 0; 0
a3
a2 b2
a1 0; 0; 0 0; 0; 2
b1 0; 0; 2 1; 1; 2
b3
a2 b2
a1 1; 1; 1 0; 0; 0
b1 0; 0; 0 1; 1; 1
c3
Figure 3.
The type space is also trivial: T1 = T2 = T3 = fg. In fact, this is a complete informa-
tion game. As both strategy proles (a1; a2; a3) and (b1; b2; b3) are Bayesian Nash equilibria,
fa1; b1g  fa2; b2g  fa3; b3g is a subset of rationalizable action proles (for any notion of
rationalizability).
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With IIR, for player 3, actions a3 and b3 strictly dominate c3; because for any product
conjecture on player 1 and player 2s actions, the maximal payo¤ of player 3 from playing a3
and b3 is at least 32 ; while playing c3 pays at most 1: As a result, c3 is never a best response,
and hence is not rationalizable for player 3.
With IPCR, c3 is rationalizable. Player 3 may conjecture that player 1 and 2 play the
following correlated strategy: each of (a1; a2) and (b1; b2) is played with probability half. Given
this correlated strategy, the payo¤ for player 3 is 1, no matter which strategy in A3 she
takes: In other words, c3 also becomes rationalizable.
3 Hierarchies of beliefs
We rst present Mertens and Zamirs conventional formulation of hierarchies of beliefs (see
also Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)), and based on that present Ely and P¾eskis construc-
tion of -hierarchies of beliefs.
3.1 Mertens-Zamirs formulation of hierarchies of beliefs
Type spaces are objects articially constructed by the modeler to overcome the di¢ culty of
working with playersinnite hierarchies of beliefs. An innite hierarchy of beliefs describes
a players belief and higher-order beliefs about states of nature. For any type space, the
following denition recovers for us the hierarchy of beliefs that each type ti of player i
represents.
Let X0 = ; and for k  1; Xk = Xk 1  j 6=i(Xk 1): Let h1(ti) = marg i(ti);
which is player is belief over  at type ti: For each k  1; let hk(ti)[S] = i(ti)[f(; t i) :
(; (hl(t i))1lk 1) 2 Sg]; for any measurable subset S  Xk. In the construction, hk(ti) 2
(Xk 1) represents player is k-th order belief at ti. The prole h(ti) = (h1(ti); :::; hk(ti); :::) 2
1k=0Xk is called player is hierarchy of beliefs at type ti:Mertens and Zamir show the exis-
14
tence of a universal type space4 into which all other belief-closed subspaces5 can be embedded
through a belief preserving mapping.
The main result from DFM sets up a connection between conventional hierarchies of
beliefs and interim correlated rationalizability:
Proposition 1 (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, 2007). If ti 2 T , t0i 2 T 0, and h(ti) = h(t0i);
then ICRTi (tijG) = ICRTi (t0ijG);8G 2 G.
Thus if two types induce the same conventional hierarchy of beliefs, no matter which
type spaces they belong to, an action that is interim correlated rationalizable at one must
also be interim correlated rationalizable at another.
3.2 -hierarchy of beliefs
A -hierarchy of beliefs describes a players belief and higher-order beliefs about conditional
beliefs on states of nature. The concept was introduced by Ely and P¾eski (2006) in their
study of interim independent rationalizability. Ely and P¾eski observe that conditional beliefs
over the states of nature play a key role in identifying the information that is necessary and
su¢ cient for the behavioral prediction of IIR, and that hierarchy of beliefs over conditional
beliefs fully identies such information.
We begin with dening conditional beliefs. Given a belief i(ti) 2 (T i); the condi-
tional belief6 of type ti over; conditioning on the otherstypes being t i; is i(ti)(t i) 2 ,
also written as i(ti; t i): For any type ti in a type space T , denote the set of all possible
conditional beliefs at ti as Bi(ti) = fi(ti; t i) 2  : t i 2 T ig: Type tis belief over T i
4Throughout, we do not actually work on the universal type space, and thus explicit construction of it is
omitted.
5A subspace (Ti; i)i2N is belief-closed if 8i 2 N; each type ti 2 Ti; i(ti)[T i] = 1.
6Since (T i ) is a complete metric space, there always exists a version of regular conditional proba-
bility (cf., e.g., Durrett (2004)).
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then induces a belief over  : for any measurable subset S  ; i(ti)[S] = i(ti)[ft i :
i(ti; t i) 2 Sg]:
Now we dene -hierarchy of beliefs at ti by treating the set of possible conditional
beliefs, i.e., ; as the set of basic uncertainty. Let the rst-order belief be player is belief
over the set of conditional beliefs, second-order belief be player is belief over the others
beliefs over the set of conditional beliefs, and so on.
Formally, x any type space T = (Ti; i)i2N on , we transform it into a type space
T = (Ti; 

i )i2N on . In the new type space, players type sets are unchanged, and
i (ti) 2 (T i ) is given by
i (ti)[S] = i(ti)[ft i : (t i; i(ti; t i)) 2 Sg];
for any measurable subset S  (T i ):
Ely and P¾eski show that if conditional beliefs are jointly measurable in ti and t i, then
i (ti) 2 (T i  ) is measurable and hierarchies of beliefs over conditional beliefs can
be constructed7.
Lemma 1 (Ely and P¾eski, 2006). If i(; ) : Ti  T i !  is jointly measurable in ti and
t i, then i () : Ti ! (T i ) is measurable.
Denote the conventional hierarchy of beliefs at ti in the type space T as h(tijT).
Denition 3. In any type space T , for any k  1; let the k-th order -hierarchy of beliefs
at ti 2 Ti be hk(tijT) and denote it as k(ti). Also, denote the -hierarchy of beliefs at ti
as (ti) = (1(ti); :::; k(ti); :::).
By denition, (ti) = h(tijT).8
7Shmaya (2007) shows the existence of a regular conditional probability that is jointly measurable in ti
and t i; given that (T i A i) is Polish.
8Although Ely and P¾eski (2006) constructs -hiearchies of beliefs only for two players, the construction
and all relevant proofs extend in an obvious way for type spaces with more than two players.
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4 Rationalizability and hierarchies of beliefs
Let us illustrate intuitively how conditional beliefs matter for playersrational behavior. At
the interim stage of the game, player i knows her type ti; but does not know the types
of other players t i and the state of nature . We can view (ti; t i; ) as an ex post state
of the world, and (ti; t i) an interim scenario. At ti; before making the decision on which
action to play, player i will take the following thought process: rst she assigns probability
i(ti)[t i] to the interim scenario (ti; t i); then conditional on the otherstypes being t i,
she conjectures that they will play some correlated strategy  i(t i)[] 2 A i; and at the
same time, she updates her belief over  to be i(ti; t i) 2 : The thought process helps
us to further decompose a conjecture v of player i such that its marginal on A i can be
written as
mv =
Z
T i
i(ti; t i)[]   i(t i)[a i]  i(ti)[dt i];
where i(ti; t i) 2  is player is conditional belief at ti given t i; as previously dened.
Since type-correlated strategies  i() can be arbitrary, the set of conjectures is determined
by a players belief on conditional beliefs.
4.1 Main theorem
The following result shows that two types provide the same IPCR prediction if and only if
they have the same -hierarchy of beliefs.
Theorem 1. If ti 2 T; t0i 2 T 0, then (ti) = (t0i) if and only if RTi (tijG) = RT 0i (t0ijG);8G 2 G.
Proof. We present the proof for su¢ ciency here. The proof necessity, preceded with a sketch
of its key idea, is presented in the appendix.
Fix a game G 2 G. We need to show that if (ti) = (t0i), then RTi (ti) = RT 0i (t0i): Denote
the set of all possible conjectures of player i in the k-th round of the elimination procedure
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by
V ki (ti) =
8>>>><>>>>:
v 2 (T i  A i) such that:
(1)v[(t i; ; a i)] > 0) a i 2 RT i;(k 1)(t i);
(2)
R
T i
v[(t i; ; a i)]dt i =
R
T i
i(ti; t i)[] i(t i)[a i]i(ti)[dt i]:
:
Denote the set of marginals of V ki (ti) on  A i by margA i V ki (ti): From the denition
of rationalizability, the set of marginals on A i determines the set of justiable expected
payo¤s, thus determines the set of rationalizable actions. That is, if margA i V
k
i (ti) =
margA i V
k
i (t
0
i); then R
T
i;k(ti) = R
T 0
i;k(t
0
i):
Step 1. We start with the case of k = 1 and then prove the rest inductively. Consider
the probability space (T i; i(ti)[]; T i); where i(ti)[] 2 T i is the marginal of i(ti) 2
(T i) over T i and T i is the usual Borel -algebra. View i(ti; ) : T i ! Bi(ti)  
as a random variable on T i, and denote the -algebra generated by it by (i(ti; )). Since
T i is a compact metric space, there exists a regular conditional probability that maps from
T i  T i to [0; 1] given (i(ti; )) (see, for example, Durrett (2004)). Since the conditional
probability is (i(ti; )) measurable, by a little abuse of notation, we can write it as i(ti; ) :
Bi(ti)! T i. Now, the marginal distribution for a given conjecture v 2 (T iA i)
over  A i can be expressed as
mv =
Z
T i
i(ti; t i)[] i(t i)[a i]di(ti)[t i]
=
Z
Bi(ti)
Z
ft i:i(ti;t i)=g
i(ti; t i)[] i(t i)[a i]i(ti; )[dt i]1(ti)[d]
=
Z
Bi(ti)
[]i(ti; )[ i(t i)[a i]]1(ti)[d]
We are ready to construct a conjecture v0 for type t0i such that v
0 = v. Suppose t0i
believes that the others play the following type-correlated strategy: for any type t0 i such
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that 0i(t
0
i; t
0
 i) = ,
0 i(t
0
 i)[a i] =
Z
ft i:i(ti;t i)=g
 i(t i)[a i]i(ti; )[dt i]
= i(ti; )[ i(t i)[a i]];8a i 2 A i:
Intuitively, t0i believes that at all types t
0
 i; 
0
i(t
0
i; t
0
 i) = , action a i is played with the
average of the probabilities it is played with at types t i; i(ti; t i) = . The marginal
distribution over  A i of the conjecture v0 is
mv
0
=
Z
T 0 i
0i(t
0
i; t
0
 i)[]
0
 i(t
0
 i)[a i]
0
i(t
0
i)[dt
0
 i]
=
Z
Bi(t0i)
Z
ft0 i:0i(t0i;t0 i)=g
0i(t
0
i; t
0
 i)[]
0
 i(t
0
 i)[a i]
0
i(t
0
i; )[dt
0
 i]
1(t0i)[d]
=
Z
Bi(t0i)
[]
Z
ft0 i:0i(t0i;t0 i)=g
i(ti; )[ i(t i)[a i]]0i(t
0
i; )[dt
0
 i]
1(t0i)[d]
=
Z
Bi(ti)
[]i(ti; )[ i(t i)[a i]]1(ti)[d]
= mv,
where the rst and second equality are natural, the third equality comes the construction
of 0 i(t
0
 i)[a i]; and the fourth equality due to Bi(ti) = Bi(t
0
i); 
1(ti) = 
1(t0i) and thatR
ft0 i:0i(t0i;t0 i)=g 
0
i(t
0
i; )[dt
0
 i] = 1.
We have shown that any marginal in margA i V
1
i (ti) also belongs to margA i V
1
i (t
0
i);
i.e.,margA i V
k
i (ti)  margA i V ki (t0i). By symmetry,margA i V 1i (t0i)  margA i V 1i (ti);
and hence margA i V
1
i (ti) = margA i V
1
i (t
0
i): By denition, R
T
i;1(ti) = R
T 0
i;1(t
0
i); for all
G 2 G.
Step 2. We prove inductively for cases of k > 1. Suppose RTi;(k 1)(ti) = R
T 0
i;(k 1)(t
0
i) for all
G 2 G, and k(ti) = k(t0i). Denote the support of k(ti) and k(t0i) as Dk 1(ti) and Dk 1(t0i);
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respectively. We know instantly that Dk 1(ti) = Dk 1(t0i). Denote a typical element in
Dk 1(ti) as (; k 11 )  (; (l)1lk 1): Similar to step 1, we can express the marginal of any
conjecture v 2 (T i RT i;(k 1)) as
marg
RT i;(k 1)
v =
Z
Dk 1(ti)
Z
ft i:i(ti;t i)=;k 11 (t i)=k 11 g
i(ti; t i)[]
 i(t i)[a i]i(ti; (; k 11 ))[dt i]
k(ti)[d(; 
k 1
1 )]
=
Z
Dk 1(ti)
[]
Z
ft i:i(ti;t i)=;k 11 (t i)=k 11 g
 i(t i)[a i]
i(ti; (; 
k 1
1 ))[dt i]
k(ti)[d(; 
k 1
1 )];
where i(ti; (; k 11 )) is the conditional belief of ti over t i at (; 
k 1
1 ). To construct the
corresponding v0 2 (T 0 i  A i) for v, for any t0 i such that 0i(t0i; t0 i) = ; k 11 (t0 i) =
k 11 (t i); let
0 i(t
0
 i)[a i] =
Z
ft i:i(ti;t i)=;k 11 (t i)=k 11 g
 i(t i)[a i]i(ti; (; k 11 ))[dt i];
for all a i 2 RT i;(k 1); and 0 otherwise. We can check that again the induced marginal
on A i from the conjecture v0 coincides with that from v. Following the same argument
as in step 1; RTi;k(ti) = R
T
i;k(t
0
i); for all G 2 G.
The proof above also indicates that if k(ti) = k(t0i); then R
T
i;k(tijG) = Ri;k(t0ijG);8G 2 G.
That is, k-th order of beliefs over conditional beliefs characterize level-k interim partially
correlated rationalizable actions. To see the intuition, notice that whether an action is rst-
order rationalizable is determined by the set of conjectures that can be supported by type-
correlated strategies, and this set is in turn characterized by playersbeliefs over conditional
beliefs. The k-order conjectures depend on both beliefs on conditional beliefs and beliefs on
the otherslevel-(k  1) rationalizable actions, thus are determined by the k-th order beliefs.
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The su¢ ciency part of Theorem 1 parallels with Proposition 1, and the whole theorem
is an extension of Ely and P¾eskis main result (Ely and P¾eski, 2006, section 4, theorem 2:)
from two-player games to n-player games. Our proof of the su¢ ciency part di¤ers from that
of Ely and P¾eskis; and the proof of necessity, which we present in the appendix, adapts Ely
and P¾eskis, but uses a di¤erent approach that is more direct and accessible. We refrain from
working with abstract structures like conditional belief preserving mappings, the universal
type space of -hierarchies of beliefs, the universal type space for rationalizability, and so
on.
4.2 Connections between IPCR and ICR
4.2.1 Harsanyi vs. Aumann
The denitions of IPCR and ICR adopt Harsanyis principle and Aumanns Bayesian view,
respectively. The two approaches di¤er mainly in whether actions are treated as type-
contingent variables or not. In Harsanyis principle, it is common knowledge among players
that all players believe that the othersactions depend only on their types and nature a¤ects
actions only indirectly through types; that is, it is common knowledge that for all i, player
i believes that conditional on t i; a i is independent of . However, common knowledge of
such beliefs is not inherent in Aumanns Bayesian view; according to this viewpoint, player
i forms a subjective belief v 2 (T i    A i), and a i can correlate with t i and 
arbitrarily. The distinction is indicated more clearly in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris, 2007). The constraint on a conjecture v in the
denition of ICR can be equivalently expressed as: there exists a state-and-type correlated
strategy  i : T i ! A i such that
mv =
Z
T i
i(ti)[(t i; )]   i(t i; )[a i]  i(ti)[dt i]:
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An ICR conjecture needs to be supported by some strategy which depends also on states
of nature. In other words, there is information about  that a¤ects the othersdecision but
is not incorporated in the type prole t i. A "deep" Bayesian player9 would be able to locate
such information and incorporate it into the otherstypes such that conditional on the new
types of the others, player i believes that a i is independent of . As a result, the new type
space which is a (an) renement (enlargement) of T satises Harsanyis principle.
To dene solution concepts based on di¤erent viewpoints, Harsanyis and Aumanns, we
need to construct type spaces that incorporate di¤erent amounts of information. Alterna-
tively, x any articially constructed type space, the choice of the "right" solution concept
should be determined by the information incorporated in the types. The distinction between
IPCR and ICR is methodological.
The following proposition describes a consistency between the two solution concepts: the
set of ICR actions at any type is exactly the union of the IPCR actions in its renements.
Proposition 2. Fix any game G 2 G. For any type ti;
S
ft0i:h(t0i)=h(ti)g
Ri(t
0
i) = ICRi(ti):
Proof. We rst prove that LHS  RHS: Since ICR and IPCR can be identied by con-
ventional hierarchies of beliefs and -hierarchies of beliefs, respectively, and that two types
have the same -hierarchy of beliefs only if they have the same conventional hierarchy of
beliefs, it is su¢ cient to show that for any ti;
Ri(ti)  ICRi(ti):
This is trivially true as the set of marginals of conjectures over A i of IPCR in each
9Equivalently, we may view that a player modeled by the partial Bayesian approach reasons "deeper"
than one modeled by the universal Bayesian approach.
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round of elimination is a subset of that of ICR, which means fewer actions can be justied
and more actions are to be eliminated.
Second, RHS  LHS. We need to show that for any ai 2 ICRi(ti); there exists t0i with
h(t0i) = h(ti) such that ai 2 Ri(t0i). We start with constructing a hierarchy of beliefs over
conditional beliefs. Suppose ti belongs to some type space (Ti; i)i2N on . Now consider a
new type space ~T dened on ; with the same set of types for each player, and states of
nature replaced with point masses, i.e., replace  with 1fg: And for any measurable subset
S of T i, ~i(ti)[(S;1fg)] = i(ti)[(S; )]. Now let t0i be some type such that (t
0
i) equals
h(tij ~T ); the conventional hierarchy of beliefs of ti in ~T . Since (t0i) characterizes exactly the
same information as h(ti), Ri(t0i) necessarily equals ICRi(ti). To see this, suppose t
0
i is in
some type space T 0: If at ti; ai 2 ICR1i (ti) is justied by some conjecture supported by a
state-and-type correlated strategy  i; we can construct 
0
 i for t
0
i as follows: for any t
0
 i
such that i(t0i; t
0
 i) = 1fg; let 
0
 i(t
0
 i)[a i] = 

 i(t i; )[a i];8a i 2 A i.
4.2.2 Nature as another player
An example in DFM (2007, section 3.2) suggests that IPCR is potentially sensitive to the
addition of an omniscient player (e.g., nature) and may not be a good solution concept. We
argue that there is a very bright side behind that example, by showing that when nature is
added as another player, IPCR coincides with ICR. Therefore, compared with ICR, for any
xed type space, adopting IPCR as the solution concept is more general.
Consider that we add nature as another player into a game G with type space T . Natures
type space is : Since nature knows her own type, at each type  she knows the true state
is . Suppose that natures action does not a¤ect the payo¤ of the others, and that players
beliefs over natures types are consistent with their beliefs on T i   in T: Denote the
expanded game as GN and the expanded type space as TN .
It is obvious from Corollary 1 that the set of IPCR actions GN is the same as the set of
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ICR actions in G; at any type ti. This is because for player i, a type-correlated strategy of
the othersin GN becomes  i : T i   ! A i; which is the same as a state-and-type
correlated strategy in G. In accordance, the -hierarchy of beliefs at any type ti in TN
reduces into its conventional hierarchy of beliefs in T . Denote the -hierarchy of type ti in
the expanded type space TN as (tijTN).
Proposition 3. Fix a game G and type spaces T; T 0:
1. RT
N
i (tijGN) = ICRTi (tijG);8ti 2 Ti.
2. For any ti 2 Ti; t0i 2 T 0i ; h(ti) = h(t0i) if and only if (tijTN) = (t0ijT 0Ni ).
Proof. Part 1 is by denition. For part 2, observe that when nature is added as another
player, the conditional belief at ti conditioning on the otherstypes (t i; ) reduces to point
mass on .
The proposition is directly implied by the fact that when nature is added in to the game,
Harsanyis principle and Aumanns Bayesian view are equivalent.
4.3 Relevant issues
4.3.1 Equivalent formulations of IPCR
Recall that in complete information games, correlated rationalizability can be dened in
multiple equivalent ways. There are also multiple equivalent ways of dening ICR, as dis-
cussed and checked in DFM (2007). To show that IPCR is as legitimate as ICR as an
extension of correlated rationalizability in complete information games, we present its itera-
tive elimination of strictly dominated actions formulation and check its equivalence with the
iterative elimination of never best response actions formulation. Its equivalence with other
formulations can be routinely checked.
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Denition 4. Fix a game G and a type space T . For all ti 2 Ti; UTi;0(ti) = Ai: An action
is level-(k + 1) rationalizable at ti, i.e., ai 2 UTi;k+1(ti); if there does not exist i 2 Ai such
that X
a i;
gi(ai; a i; )mv[(a i; )] <
X
a i;
gi(i; a i; )mv[(a i; )];
for all v 2 (T i    A i) that satises (t i; ; a i) 2 supp v ) a i 2 (UTj;k(tj))j 6=i and
the constraint on conjectures (item 3). And UTi (ti) = \1k=1UTi;k(ti):
Proposition 4. UTi (ti) = R
T
i (ti):
Proof. If an action is strictly dominated, it is never a best response. Therefore, Uki (ti) 
Rki (ti);8k  1. We only need to show the other direction, that 8k  1; Rki (ti)  Uki (ti): We
prove by induction. First notice that RTi;0(ti) = U
T
i;0(ti). Suppose for some k  1; RTi;k(ti) =
UTi;k(ti), we show that R
T
i;k+1(ti)  UTi;k+1(ti). If ai =2 Ri;k+1(ti); given any ICR conjecture
v 2 (T i RT i;k(t i)), there exists i 2 Ai such that
v[gi(ai; a i; )] < v[gi(i; a i; )]:
Since the inequality holds for all ICR conjectures v, and the set of is is compact,
inf
v
sup
i
(v[gi(i; a i; )]  v[gi(ai; a i; )]) > 0:
Observe that as a function of v and i, (v[gi(i; a i; )]  v[gi(ai; a i; )]) is linear in both
arguments, that the set of is is convex compact, and that the set of IPCR conjectures is a
convex subset of a vector space, we can apply the minimax theorem and obtain
sup
i
inf
v
(v[gi(i; a i; )]  v[gi(ai; a i; )]) > 0:
That is, for all conjecture that satisfy the constraints, there exists i that strictly domi-
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nates ai, ai =2 UTi;k+1(ti). Therefore, RTi;k+1(ti)  UTi;k+1(ti).
4.3.2 Insu¢ ciency of -hierarchies of beliefs for IIR
We show by example that -hierarchies of beliefs are not su¢ cient for IIR.
Example 4. Given the game form and type space T in Example 3, we construct another
type space T 0 as follows: T 01 = T
0
2 = f 1;+1g; T 03 = fg, and there is a common prior
(t01; t
0
2; ; ) 2 (T 01  T 02  T 03 ) such that
(t01; t2; ; ) =
8><>:
1
2
if t01 = t
0
2;
0 otherwise.
The types of player 3 in T and T 0 have the same -hierarchy of beliefs, which is common
knowledge on the point mass of . However, the sets of IIR actions at them are di¤erent. To
see that, suppose player 3 believes that i(+1) = ai; i( 1) = bi for i = 1; 2, she thinks the
others play (a1; a2) and (b1; b2) each with probability 12 . Under this belief, c3 is an IIR action
for her. But in T it is not. This is because T 0 is redundant with respect to -hierarchies of
beliefs, and the redundancy enlarges player 1 and 2s action set and provides extra correlation.
The type space T 0 can be generated from T with a partially correlating device dened in
the next section.
5 The Bayesian solution
5.1 Denition
The Bayesian solution is a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete infor-
mation proposed by Forges (1993). Its denition is inspired by Aumanns Bayesian view and
26
aims at capturing Bayesian rationality. In this section, we establish the equivalence between
the Bayesian solution and IPCR.
Following Forges (2006), the denition of the Bayesian solution involves the use of an
epistemic model Y = (Y; #; (Si; i; i; pi)i2N) into which the type space T = (Ti; i)i2N can
be embedded10. In the epistemic model, Y is the set of states of the world which is large
enough to characterize uncertainties in states of nature, agentstypes, and agentsactions;
Si denotes player is informational partition, and pi denotes player is subjective prior. The
mapping # : Y !  indicates the state of nature, i : Y ! Ti indicates player is type, and
i : Y ! Ai indicates is action. Both i and i are assumed to be Si measurable; hence at
any state, player i knows both her type and action. The consistency in beliefs requires that
for any measurable subset S  T i  and S 0  T i;
pi[( i; #) 1(S)jSi] = i[Sji]; (5.1)
pi[ i 1(S 0)jSi] = pi[ i 1(S 0)ji];8i 2 N:
The rst condition requires that the epistemic model does not give players extra infor-
mation on the joint distribution of the otherstypes and states of nature, and the second
condition further requires that it does not give extra information on the otherstypes. The
two conditions together, guarantees belief invariance (the invariance of conditional beliefs).
Given the epistemic model, we dene Bayesian rationality for player i: player i is Bayesian
rational if
E[gi(i;  i; #)jSi]  E[gi(ai;  i; #)jSi];8ai 2 Ai;
where the expectation is taken over T i and .
Denition 5. Given a game G and a type space T , a Bayesian solution for the game is an
10Forgess denition of the Bayesian solution is restricted to two-player games with type spaces with a
common prior; what we present here is the n-player non-common prior analogue of her denition.
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epistemic model Y = (Y; #; (Si; i; i; pi)i2N) constructed as above that satises the Bayesian
rationality of every player.
For any Bayesian solution Y , let i(y) 2 (  A i) be player is belief over states of
nature and the othersactions in the state of the world y, and (y)  (i(y))i2N be a prole
of playersbeliefs. From a point of view analogous to the "revelation principle", the set of
proles of beliefs f(y) : y 2 Y g can be implemented canonically from a partial correlating
device q = (qi)i2N ; such that qi : T ! A satises:
1. player i believes that at any type prole t an action prole a 2 A is selected according
to qi(t) 2 A; and then aj is recommended to player j;8j 2 N; by an omniscient
mediator who observes all playerstypes.
2. belief invariance is satised, i.e., from the recommendations they receive, players cannot
infer any information on the otherstypes. Formally, at di¤erent types t i; t0 i of the
others, type ti of player i receive recommendation ai with the same probability,
X
fa02A:a0i=aig
qi(ti; t i)[a0] =
X
fa02A:a0i=aig
qi(ti; t
0
 i)[a
0];8i; ti; ai;
and that each player does not have incentive to deviate from the mediators recommen-
dation at any of her types.
Remark 1. The denition of the Bayesian solution involves using epistemic models, this
indirectly provides us with conditions on the epistemic foundation of IPCR. DFM (2007,
section 3:4) show that ICR characterizes common certainty of rationality and of the correct-
ness of the standard type space; by correctness of the standard type space, they require only
that players have correct beliefs about T i  . To justify IPCR with epistemic models, we
also need the model to preserve conditional beliefs, which can be achieved by requiring belief
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invariance. Intuitively, IPCR characterizes common certainty of rationality, correct beliefs
and invariance of conditional beliefs.
5.2 Equivalence with IPCR
A Bayesian solution is equivalent to a partial correlating device q under which players are
incentive compatible. Recall that in the denition of IPCR (Denition 1), a conjecture of
player i; v 2 (T iA i) needs to be justied by a correlated strategy  i : T i ! A i
of the others. This correlated strategy, however, is not natural since it assumes that the
strategy of each j 6= i is not measurable with respect to js own types, but with respect to the
type prole of  i. The following lemma states that all conjectures in IPCR can be justied
by an incentive compatible partial correlating device, and hence by a Bayesian solution11.
Lemma 2. Any correlated strategy  i : T i ! A i can be induced from a prole of
strategies (~j)j 6=i; ~j : Tj Aj ! Aj, in which each players action depends only on her own
type and the action recommended from an incentive compatible partially correlating device q.
Proof. Fix a correlated strategy  i : T i ! A i. Suppose that player is type is ti:
Construct the partial correlating device such that qi(ti; t i)[a i] =  i(t i)[a i];8t i 2 T i;
and let qj be arbitrary, for all j 6= i. Given that player i believes at each t i 2 T i, the others
are recommended actions according to qi(ti; t i), if player i conjectures that the others follow
11The agent-normal-form correlated equilibrium proposed by Samuelson and Zhang (1989) is of similar
form to the Bayesian solution. An agent-normal-form correlated equilibrium can be implemented by a
correlating device Q 2 (iATii ) and a mediator. A prole of strategies  = (i)i2N is chosen randomly
according to Q and the mediator who observes ti recommends the action i(ti) to agent ti. If no type has
the incentive to deviate, Q implements equilibrium.
Such correlated equilibria also satisfy belief invariance and provide some correlations in the interim stage.
However, a close look at it would reveal that the correlations are not interim types dependent; it operates in
the ex ante stage, and the correlation happens only across ex ante strategies but not interim type dependent
actions of the others. Consequently, many type-correlated strategies of IPCR cannot be justied by agent-
normal-form correlated equilibrium. (See Forges (2006) for more discussion.)
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independent strategies ~j(tj; aj) = aj; i.e., they always follow the recommendations, then i
believes that the othersplay at t i is exactly qi(ti; t i)[a i], which equals to  i(t i)[a i].
Lemma 2 is directly implied by the fact that both IPCR and the Bayesian solution follow
the same viewpoint, Harsanyis principle, in characterizing correlation. In both concepts,
the correlation can be achieved by sending to players type prole dependent signals (recom-
mendations) in a belief invariant way.
We can further show the payo¤ equivalence between IPCR and the Bayesian solution,
as an analogue of Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) which establishes the payo¤ equivalence
between correlated rationalizability and a posteriori equilibrium in complete information
games. For any game G and any type space T , an interim IPCR payo¤ of player i at type
ti is the maximal payo¤ i can possibly obtain given some IPCR conjecture v 2 (T i   
RT i(t ijG)). Let Wi(ti) be the set of interim payo¤s of player i at type ti.
Proposition 5. Fix any game G and type space T . A vector u = (ui(ti))i2N;ti2Ti 2
i2N;ti2TiWi(ti) is a prole of interim partially rationalizable payo¤s if and only if there
is a Bayesian solution in which it is a vector of interim payo¤s.
Proof. Necessity is straightforward due to Lemma 2. In any incentive compatible partial
correlating device q, if an action ai of player i is played in the Bayesian solution at type ti,
then ai is a best response to qi(ti; t i)[a i]. Let the support of q be supp q  A, then supp q
satises the best response property, i.e., any action prole a 2 supp q is IPCR. Thus any
vector of interim payo¤s is interim partially correlated rationalizable.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose at type ti; ui(ti) is achieved by playing ai against a correlated strat-
egy  i : T i ! RT i(t ijG). Construct qi such that qi(ti; t i)[ai; a i] =  i(t i)[a i];8t i; a i,
then when i is recommended to play ai; she believes that the others are playing the corre-
lated strategy  i. The same construction of qi(ti; ) can be done for each i 2 N and ti 2 Ti.
We also restrict q to be incentive compatible on other action proles that do not support u.
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The partial correlating device thus dened implements a Bayesian solution, and when ai is
recommended to type ti, player is expected payo¤ is ui(ti).
6 Conclusion
For any xed type space, we propose a notion of interim "correlated" rationalizability that
respects the structure of the type space in the least sense, by assuming that the actions
of the othersare dependent on their types. It then turns out that hierarchies of beliefs on
conditional beliefs play a key role in the characterization of the solution. The characterization
also implies that to construct type spaces that satisfy Harsanyis principle, we need more
information than just playersbeliefs and higher-order beliefs about states of nature. This
paper belongs to the literature that characterize implications of type spaces with respect to
di¤erent solution concepts.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we present the proof of necessity in the main theorem. We use an
approach di¤erent from that used in Ely and P¾eskis proof of their main theorem, but that
uses their intermediate results. Our proof can be viewed as an adaptation and at the same
time a simplication of Ely and P¾eskis proof. The approach we use is very similar to that
used by Gossner and Mertens (2001) in constructing zero-sum betting games to separate the
behavior of types with di¤erent conventional hierarchies of beliefs.
Before moving on to the notationally involved proof, we summarize its key idea, which
is simple. We construct inductively games that separate the behaviors of types that di¤er
in each order of beliefs. More specically, in the rst step, for any pair of types that have
di¤erent rst-order beliefs, we construct a game in which the two types have di¤erent sets
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of rationalizable actions. Then, for any two types with di¤erent second-order beliefs, we let
the player play against the other players who are playing games constructed in the rst step.
Since the types have di¤erent beliefs about the othersrst-order beliefs, which determines
the others rationalizable actions, they will have di¤erent beliefs about the othersaction
sets. The di¤erence in beliefs again allows us to construct a game in which the two types
have di¤erent set of rationalizable actions. This procedure can be replicated in a way that
for any two types that di¤er in the k-th order beliefs, we let the player play against the
others who are playing games constructed in the (k   1)-th step. The separating games are
very much like betting games in which players are asked to bet on the othersactions. This
is because in each separating game a players payo¤ depends on the othersactions, but the
others are playing games constructed one step lower and their payo¤s are not a¤ected by
this players action in the current game. And we know that bets reveal beliefs.
Proof. Assume (ti) 6= (t0i): Due to the consistency of -hierarchy of beliefs, we decompose
the proof by discussing cases of k(ti) 6= k(t0i); l(ti) = l(t0i);81  l  k; i.e., in the k-th
case, the-hierarchies of beliefs at ti and t0i di¤er starting from the k-th level belief. For each
case, we construct a game that separates the types in their IPCR behavior. The construction
of games is inductive.
Step 1 (k = 1). In the rst step we consider the case of 1(ti) 6= 1(t0i); i.e., when
two types have di¤erent beliefs over conditional beliefs. We rst present an adapted version
of lemma 50 in Ely and P¾eski (2006). Let F = ff :  ! [0;1) such that f() =
maxk2f1;:::;mgN 1 [ (k; )] for some natural number m and continuous bounded function
 : f1; :::;mgN 1 ! [0;1)g:
Lemma 3. The collection of sets f : [f ] < 0g  () for f 2 F generate the weak-
topology on (): This topology is normal, and therefore any pair of disjoint closed subsets
S; S 0 2 () can be separated by open sets, and there is a function f 2 F such that 8 2 S
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and 0 2 S 0;
[f ] 6= 0[f ]:
Since the proof to Lemma 3 is a special case of lemma 50 in Ely and P¾eski (2006), we
only sketch the idea here. Let H denote the Hilbert cube [0; 1]N; since  is a second
countable Hausdor¤ space, there is a mapping H :  ! H that embeds  into H
(Urysohn metrization theorem, cf. Aliprantis and Border (2006), theorem 3.40). Since H
is an embedding, the problem of showing f : [f ] < 0g  () for f 2 F generates
the weak-topology on () transforms into showing that there is a family of continuous
functions f : H! R such that the collection of sets f : [f(h)] < 0g generates the weak-
topology on (H): Let F 0n = ff : [0; 1]n!R such that f(h1; :::; hn) = max2f1;:::;mg   hg
for some natural number m and a prole of vectors 1; :::; m 2 [0; 1]n:We can prove that the
set L0n = ff   g : f; g 2 F 0ng is uniformly dense in the set C([0; 1]n), and hence the family
of functions [nL0n generates the topology on (H): Now dene F = ff : f() = f 0(H())
for some f 0 2 [nL0ng; we see that [nL0n corresponds to the image of F from the embedding
H. Since the topology is Hausdor¤ on a compact space, it is normal, therefore any pair of
disjoint closed subsets can be separated by two open sets.
In order to construct a game in which ti and t0i have distinct sets of rationalizable actions,
we need the following corollary which is immediate from Lemma 3.
Corollary 2. If 1(ti); 1(t0i) 2 () and 1(ti) 6= 1(t0i); then there exists a natural number
m and a continuous bounded function  : f1; :::;mgN 1! [0;1) such that for f : !
R dened by f() = maxk2f1;:::;mgN 1 [ (k; )]; we have
1(ti)[f ] 6= 1(t0i)[f ]:
Without loss of generality, suppose 1(t0i)[f ] < 
1(ti)[f ]: By linearity of expectation, there
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is a  > 0 such that 1(t0i)[f   1] < 0 < 1(ti)[f   1]:
With Corollary 2 we construct a nite game Gi(1(ti); 1(t0i)) = (ui; Ai)i2N for player
i to separate the behavior at types with rst-order belief 1(ti) and types with rst-order
belief 1(t0i). Let Ai = f0; 1g; and Aj = f1; :::;mg;8j 6= i. Let the payo¤s to the others be
constant, e.g., for all aj; a j; ; uj(aj; a j; ) = 0; and let the payo¤ to player i be
ui(ai; a i; ) = ai[ (a i; )  1]:
With these payo¤s, for any other player, all actions in f1; :::mg are rationalizable. For
player i, playing ai = 0 gives her 0, while the payo¤ from playing ai = 1 depends on the
actions of the others and states of nature. Player is payo¤ from playing ai = 1 is maximized
if the others play the following type-correlated strategy:
 i(t i) = argmax
k
[ (k; )];8ti such that i(ti; t i) = ; 8 2 :
The maximal payo¤ is 1(ti)[maxk [ (k; )]   1] = 1(ti)[f   1]: Since player is playo¤
from playing 1; 1(ti)[f   1]; is greater than the payo¤ from playing ai = 0; which is 0,
ai = 1 is rationalizable at ti. However, at type t0i; the maximal payo¤ from playing ai = 1 is
1(t0i)[f   1] < 0: Therefore playing ai = 1 is strictly dominated by playing ai = 0; ai = 1
is not rationalizable at t0i.
By applying Lemma 3, for any pair of disjoint closed subsets of rst-order beliefs, we
can construct a game that separates them in rationalizability. For any pair of disjoint closed
subsets S; S 0 2 (); there is a game G(S; S 0) such that for all 1 2 S; 1 2 Ri(1jG(S; S 0))
and for all ~1 2 S 0; 1 =2 Ri(~1jG(S; S 0)).
Step 2 (Induction). To carry out induction, we rst introduce an intermediate result
in Ely and P¾eski (2006). For any game G = (ui; Ai)i2N , the mapping t i ! R i(t ijG)
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denes the set of rationalizable actions for any prole of the otherstypes. For any set A,
denote 2A the set of subsets of A. For any measurable subset S   2A i, let
!(tijG)[S] = i(ti)[ft i : (i(ti; t i); R i(t ijG)) 2 Sg]:
We call !(tijG) 2 (2A i) player is rationalizable belief at ti. It is straightforward
to see that rationalizable beliefs at types determine the sets of rationalizable conjectures and
therefore the sets of best response actions.
If 2(ti) 6= 2(t0i); the two types must di¤er in their beliefs at some closed subset S 
i6=j(), thus there must be some pair of disjoint closed subsets S; S 0  j 6=i() and
a game G(S; S 0) that separates them such that !(tijG(S; S 0)) 6= !(t0ijG(S; S 0)). If player i
believes the other players are playing G(S; S 0); at ti; t0i she will have di¤erent sets of conjec-
tures about the othersactions and states of nature; this suggests that she will have di¤erent
sets of rationalizable actions at ti and t0i given that her payo¤ function is properly designed.
Theorem 2 (Ely and P¾eski, 2006, theorem 3). If two types ti and t0i di¤er in terms of their
rationalizable belief in game G, i.e., !(tijG) 6= !(t0ijG); then there is a nite game G0 in
which ti and t0i have distinct rationalizable sets, i.e., Ri(tijG0) 6= Ri(t0ijG0).
As an immediate result, if 2(ti) 6= 2(t0i); then there is a nite game G0 such that
Ri(tijG0) = Ri(t0ijG0). The construction ofG0 is very similar to the construction ofG(1(ti); 1(t0i))
in step 1; it uses a lemma more general than Lemma 3.
Let F be the set of f :  2A i ! [0;1) such that for any  2 ; Sj  Aj;8j 6= i;
f(; S i) = max
k2f1;:::;mgN 1
aj1;:::;ajm02Sj ;8j 6=i
[ (k; (aj;1; :::; aj;m0)j 6=i; )]
for some natural numbers m and m0, and continuous bounded function  : f1; :::;mgN 1 
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 i ! [0;1):
Lemma 4. The collection of sets f : [f ] < 0g  (  2A i) for f 2 F generate the
weak-topology on ( 2A i): This topology is normal, and therefore any pair of disjoint
closed subsets S; S 0 2 (  2A i) can be separated by open sets, and there is a function
f 2 F such that 8 2 S and 0 2 S 0;
[f ] 6= 0[f ]:
As a result of this lemma, there is a game G(S:S 0) that separates any pair of disjoint
closed subsets S; S 0 of second-order beliefs.
The induction works as follows. If 3(ti) 6= 3(t0i); the two types must di¤er in their
beliefs at some closed subset S 2 j 6=i(()); hence there must be some pair of disjoint
closed subsets S; S 0 2 j 6=i(()) and a game G(S; S 0) that separate them such that
!(tijG(S; S 0)) 6= !(t0ijG(S; S 0)): Applying Theorem 2 again, there must be a nite game G0
such that Ri(tijG0) = Ri(t0ijG0).
For k(ti) 6= k(t0i); k  3; respective separating games can be constructed inductively by
applying Lemma 4 and Theorem 2.
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